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	<title>Comments on: What is an &#8220;effective&#8221; control?</title>
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	<link>http://securityblog.verizonbusiness.com/2009/01/12/blog-definition-of-effectiveness/</link>
	<description>Risk Intelligence from Verizon Business Security Solutions powered by Cybertrust</description>
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		<title>By: Wade Baker</title>
		<link>http://securityblog.verizonbusiness.com/2009/01/12/blog-definition-of-effectiveness/comment-page-1/#comment-151</link>
		<dc:creator>Wade Baker</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 14 Jan 2009 20:30:57 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://securityblog.verizonbusiness.com/?p=162#comment-151</guid>
		<description>@David

Hello David. Nice to hear from you. I still like those 2 factors and see them as very similar (&quot;does what it’s supposed to&quot; ~ &quot;coverage of attack surface&quot;, &quot;to the degree it’s supposed to&quot; ~ &quot;potential strength&quot;), except your 1&amp;2 get closer to measurement/calculation of effectiveness.

As for &quot;adding competence&quot;...from my experience, anything you do has that built-in already.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>@David</p>
<p>Hello David. Nice to hear from you. I still like those 2 factors and see them as very similar (&#8221;does what it’s supposed to&#8221; ~ &#8220;coverage of attack surface&#8221;, &#8220;to the degree it’s supposed to&#8221; ~ &#8220;potential strength&#8221;), except your 1&#038;2 get closer to measurement/calculation of effectiveness.</p>
<p>As for &#8220;adding competence&#8221;&#8230;from my experience, anything you do has that built-in already.</p>
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		<title>By: David Shaw</title>
		<link>http://securityblog.verizonbusiness.com/2009/01/12/blog-definition-of-effectiveness/comment-page-1/#comment-149</link>
		<dc:creator>David Shaw</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 13 Jan 2009 21:10:47 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://securityblog.verizonbusiness.com/?p=162#comment-149</guid>
		<description>Great thread.

In some past work we opined that control effectiveness was a function of two factors: (1) the potential strength of the control , and (2) the coverage of the attack surface by the control.  Perhaps I should add a competence factor to my next version of the algorithm.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Great thread.</p>
<p>In some past work we opined that control effectiveness was a function of two factors: (1) the potential strength of the control , and (2) the coverage of the attack surface by the control.  Perhaps I should add a competence factor to my next version of the algorithm.</p>
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		<title>By: Wade Baker</title>
		<link>http://securityblog.verizonbusiness.com/2009/01/12/blog-definition-of-effectiveness/comment-page-1/#comment-148</link>
		<dc:creator>Wade Baker</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 13 Jan 2009 16:51:46 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://securityblog.verizonbusiness.com/?p=162#comment-148</guid>
		<description>@Alex:

Would &#039;effectiveness&#039; and &#039;cost&#039; cover (even if indirectly) the organization&#039;s ability to manage/use the control? In other words, if they are not equipped to manage it well, it may not do what it&#039;s supposed to do (effectiveness) or it may be too expensive or difficult (cost) to maintain/use it at effective levels. I completely agree an organization&#039;s ability to manage and use a control is an important ingredient...I&#039;m just thinking it&#039;s encompassed somewhere within cost and effectiveness. Am I off or missing your intent?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>@Alex:</p>
<p>Would &#8216;effectiveness&#8217; and &#8216;cost&#8217; cover (even if indirectly) the organization&#8217;s ability to manage/use the control? In other words, if they are not equipped to manage it well, it may not do what it&#8217;s supposed to do (effectiveness) or it may be too expensive or difficult (cost) to maintain/use it at effective levels. I completely agree an organization&#8217;s ability to manage and use a control is an important ingredient&#8230;I&#8217;m just thinking it&#8217;s encompassed somewhere within cost and effectiveness. Am I off or missing your intent?</p>
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		<title>By: Wade Baker</title>
		<link>http://securityblog.verizonbusiness.com/2009/01/12/blog-definition-of-effectiveness/comment-page-1/#comment-147</link>
		<dc:creator>Wade Baker</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 13 Jan 2009 16:15:50 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://securityblog.verizonbusiness.com/?p=162#comment-147</guid>
		<description>@Dominic:

Good point about &#039;cost&#039; being a better word than &#039;price&#039;. It was not my intention to limit &#039;price&#039; to only refer to $, but I see (and agree) that it reads that way. I&#039;ve modified accordingly. Thanks.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>@Dominic:</p>
<p>Good point about &#8216;cost&#8217; being a better word than &#8216;price&#8217;. It was not my intention to limit &#8216;price&#8217; to only refer to $, but I see (and agree) that it reads that way. I&#8217;ve modified accordingly. Thanks.</p>
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		<title>By: Chris Hayes</title>
		<link>http://securityblog.verizonbusiness.com/2009/01/12/blog-definition-of-effectiveness/comment-page-1/#comment-146</link>
		<dc:creator>Chris Hayes</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 13 Jan 2009 15:49:23 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://securityblog.verizonbusiness.com/?p=162#comment-146</guid>
		<description>I referenced one of your quotes from the securitymetrics.org list at http://chuvakin.blogspot.com/2009/01/making-pci-easy.html#respond.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I referenced one of your quotes from the securitymetrics.org list at <a href="http://chuvakin.blogspot.com/2009/01/making-pci-easy.html#respond." rel="nofollow">http://chuvakin.blogspot.com/2009/01/making-pci-easy.html#respond.</a></p>
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		<title>By: Fred</title>
		<link>http://securityblog.verizonbusiness.com/2009/01/12/blog-definition-of-effectiveness/comment-page-1/#comment-145</link>
		<dc:creator>Fred</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 13 Jan 2009 15:26:30 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://securityblog.verizonbusiness.com/?p=162#comment-145</guid>
		<description>I like your definition, David. I agree that the cost/benefit should be separate. Something may be highly effective, but the cost of the control or the negative impact to the mission make it unworkable. Or it may be marginally effective and practically not worth the effort (for example, if another, more effective, control already mitigates the related risk.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I like your definition, David. I agree that the cost/benefit should be separate. Something may be highly effective, but the cost of the control or the negative impact to the mission make it unworkable. Or it may be marginally effective and practically not worth the effort (for example, if another, more effective, control already mitigates the related risk.</p>
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		<title>By: RiskAnalys.is</title>
		<link>http://securityblog.verizonbusiness.com/2009/01/12/blog-definition-of-effectiveness/comment-page-1/#comment-144</link>
		<dc:creator>RiskAnalys.is</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 13 Jan 2009 14:58:22 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://securityblog.verizonbusiness.com/?p=162#comment-144</guid>
		<description>&lt;strong&gt;A Couple of Links on Risk &amp; Decision Making...&lt;/strong&gt;

First, I wanted to point you over to Chris&#8217; Risktical blog.  He&#8217;ll be doing a FAIR analysis over there that looks interesting.  It&#8217;s nice that Chris is dedicating his time on this, given the amount of PCI work he&#8217;s got on his .....</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>A Couple of Links on Risk &#38; Decision Making&#8230;</strong></p>
<p>First, I wanted to point you over to Chris&#8217; Risktical blog.  He&#8217;ll be doing a FAIR analysis over there that looks interesting.  It&#8217;s nice that Chris is dedicating his time on this, given the amount of PCI work he&#8217;s got on his &#8230;..</p>
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		<title>By: Alex</title>
		<link>http://securityblog.verizonbusiness.com/2009/01/12/blog-definition-of-effectiveness/comment-page-1/#comment-143</link>
		<dc:creator>Alex</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 13 Jan 2009 14:12:55 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://securityblog.verizonbusiness.com/?p=162#comment-143</guid>
		<description>I think we should consider the organizations capability to manage/use the control.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I think we should consider the organizations capability to manage/use the control.</p>
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		<title>By: Dominic White</title>
		<link>http://securityblog.verizonbusiness.com/2009/01/12/blog-definition-of-effectiveness/comment-page-1/#comment-142</link>
		<dc:creator>Dominic White</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 13 Jan 2009 10:04:43 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://securityblog.verizonbusiness.com/?p=162#comment-142</guid>
		<description>If you define price as more than just money (i.e. what % of attacks it reduces, time required from personnel as well as money) then it makes sense. In which case, possibly using the term &#039;benefit&#039; and &#039;cost&#039; may help to split that up. If you leave price as referring to just money, then the additional reasons for using a control may be lost in that definition. i.e. a company could be using a control for a very good reason that would not fit with the definition of efficient or effective.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>If you define price as more than just money (i.e. what % of attacks it reduces, time required from personnel as well as money) then it makes sense. In which case, possibly using the term &#8216;benefit&#8217; and &#8216;cost&#8217; may help to split that up. If you leave price as referring to just money, then the additional reasons for using a control may be lost in that definition. i.e. a company could be using a control for a very good reason that would not fit with the definition of efficient or effective.</p>
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