Dr. Peter Tippett, VP of Research and Risk Intelligence for Verizon Business Security Solutions, was recently interviewed by Robert Richardson at Information Week about the Data Breach Supplemental Report. Visit the links below to listen.
By Wade Baker
Today, we released a supplement to our 2008 Data Breach Investigations Report (DBIR) that focuses on four major industry groups. As many of you know, the original document compiled four years of data from over 500 cases worked by our Investigative Response team and was intended to be a kind of “state of the union” look at recent security breach and data compromise trends.
By Wade Baker
Since releasing the 2008 Data Breach Investigations Report (DBIR) in June, we’ve frequently been asked some form of the following question: “Do the findings presented in the report differ among industries?” It’s a good question, and one we’re working on answering at length in a supplemental report contrasting the four most frequently breached industries (Financial Services, Tech Services, Retail, and Food & Beverage) using the original dataset. We plan to release the report sometime next month, but would like to give you a sneak peak in this post.
You may remember that the 2008 DBIR considered three main sources, or origins, of data breaches: external, internal and partner. The upcoming supplemental report naturally adopts this same trio of sources. Based on Verizon Business caseload from 2004 through 2007, the figure below depicts the percentage of breaches attributed to internal, external and partner sources for each industry group.
By Wade Baker
Our 2008 Data Breach Investigations Report presents statistics on the percentage of breaches involving outsiders, insiders and partners (73%, 18%, and 39% respectively). Public reaction to these statistics runs the gamut from revulsion to revelry. This is especially true with respect to the relatively low percentage of breaches tied to insiders. Some seem to think we’ve blasphemed the sacred doctrines of our trade handed down from on high long ago. Others are glad to see their oft-ridiculed beliefs finally vindicated by objective data. Many in the middle are cautious about drawing conclusions, and are unsure what to make of the statistics.
Which reaction is appropriate? We won’t weigh in on that question; we’ll stick to providing data rather than dictating the reactions of others. We would, however, like to address the underlying questions fueling such reactions – whether these statistics are bogus, biased or believable.
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Symantec’s Hon Lau recently published a blog post titled “Patch Management – Speed is of the Essence.” You may know that we also recently published a blog post titled “Patching Conundrum”, in which we discussed how our studies had convinced us that patching too fast can be a “bad thing™.”
Hon Lau said, “It is this gap between the availability of patches and their application that is creating a window of opportunity for would-be attackers.”
Well, really, it isn’t. The “window of opportunity” begins when the vulnerable version of whatever is actually installed and/or implemented, and lasts until a non-vulnerable version is installed, or until the product stops being used. Nothing terribly significant occurs once a patch is released, unless you fear “Automatic Patch-Based Exploit Generation” (APEG). Hon Lau seems to.
By Peter Tippett and Wade Baker
Studies are useful to help us to learn what works and what does not. Studies of other’s experiences, such as The Verizon Business 2008 Data Breach Investigations Report, are especially instructive. But most of us crave to actually understand why events play out as they do, and to be able to accurately predict what the results of those studies will be. Risk models can be very useful in driving our understanding.
Bryan Sartin, Director of Investigative Response for Verizon Business Security Solutions, was recently interviewed by Michael Johnson at PodTech. Visit the links below to listen.
By Wade Baker
After a long working session on the “Data Breach Investigations Report”, my co-authors and I decided a lunch break was in order. Mealtime conversation meandered through a diverse range of topics and eventually settled on the recent movie “No Country for Old Men.” Dave, a bit more of film connoisseur than Andrew or I, gave it five stars. Although I appreciated the cinematography and acting, I didn’t think it lived up to all the hype it received. I believe Andrew’s sentiments were similar. We did, however, unanimously agree on one thing: if a stranger walks up to you with a tank of compressed air and tries to press a strange metal apparatus to your forehead, it’s best not to just stare blankly and let that happen.
Although they rarely look so freakishly suspicious, findings from the report remind us that a dose of healthy caution when dealing with business partners might not be a bad idea either. (more…)
One of the more commonly referenced findings from our “2008 Data Breach Investigations Report” is that 87% of breaches could have been avoided if “reasonable security controls” had been in place at the time of the incident. As this statistic filters through the press and blogs, some are suggesting our use of the term “reasonable” has legal implications, or refers to controls that are “extravagantly hard” to implement. Such interpretation is simply not justified, and we’d like to set the record straight.
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How much better is it to have a world-class patching process compared to an average one? Could it ever be detrimental to patch too fast? And what does patching have to do with cholera? Two earlier Verizon Business Risk Team Studies shed more light on this subject.
The recently published “Verizon Business 2008 Data Breach Investigations Report” describes characteristics of more than 500 computer crime investigations performed over the past four years. Our data shows that in only 18% of cases in the hacking category (see Figure 11) did the attack have anything to do with a “patchable” vulnerability. Further analysis in the study (Figure 12) showed that 90% of those attacks would have been prevented had patches been applied that were six months in age or older! Significantly, patching more frequently than monthly would have mitigated no additional cases.
At considerable investment in time and resources, Verizon Business began an initiative in 2007 to identify a comprehensive set of metrics to record during each data compromise investigation. As a result of this effort, we pursued a post-mortem examination of over 500 security breach and data compromise engagements between 2004 and 2007 which provided us with the vast amount of factual evidence used to compile this study. This data covers 230 million compromised records. Amongst these are roughly one-quarter of all publicly disclosed data breaches in both 2006 and 2007, including three of the five largest data breaches ever reported.
I used to think that Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) and Managed Security Services (MSS) were a waste of time. After all, most attacks that I had worked on began, and were over, within seconds, and were typically totally automated. In my mind, an IDS alarm going off, or getting a call from the SOC operator, would be like the captain of a ship getting an alarm such as: “Captain, a torpedo passed through engines #2 and #3, and exited the starboard flank. We will be sinking in seven minutes.”
But the Verizon Business 2008 Data Breach Investigations Report tells a very different story.
